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Under a Critical Race Theory Lens
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION:
A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY
By James T. Patterson
Original Copyright 2001, by James T. Patterson
Oxford University Press
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, Pp. 285.
Reviewed by Carlo A. Pedrioli*
Altogether, school desegregation has been a story of conspicuous
achievements, flawed by marked failures, the causes of which lie beyond
the capacity of lawyers to correct (p. 223).1
INTRODUCTION
With Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its
Troubled Legacy, historian James T. Patterson anticipated the fiftieth
anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision Brown v. Board of
Education.2 In Brown, the Court unanimously held that racially segregated
schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution’s
Fourteenth Amendment. The decision in effect struck down de jure segregation
in the United States.3 In holding as it did, the Court declared that “in the field
of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”4 Not only does Patterson’s book
capture the essence of Chief Justice Earl Warren’s opinion of the Court in
Brown, but the book also addresses the developments that have come in the
*

M.A. (Communication), University of Utah, 2003; J.D., University of the Pacific, 2002; B.A.
(Communication and English) (summa cum laude), California State University, Stanislaus, 1999.
Member, State Bar of California. Currently, the author is a Ph.D. candidate in Communication at
the University of Utah. For thoughts on and a response to a previous version of this Book
Review, the author gratefully acknowledges Brian K. Landsberg of the University of the Pacific.
1. Quoting JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 401 (1994).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. CHARLES J. OGLETREE, ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF
CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 310 (2004).
4. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (legal genesis
of the Court’s separate but equal doctrine).
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wake of the famous case. Furthermore, Patterson’s book offers an evaluation
of the implications of Brown and its progeny. In light of the fiftieth
anniversary of Brown, now is an appropriate time to consider Patterson’s
critical look at Brown and its legacy.
Accordingly, this Book Review argues that Patterson’s narrative is a
mostly balanced historical reflection. Here, the term balanced will refer to
giving consideration to both the negative and positive aspects of the
phenomenon in question. To advance its thesis, first, the Review will offer an
overview of Patterson’s historical narrative and evaluation of the Brown legacy.
Second, the Review will analyze Patterson’s conclusions through a Critical
Race Theory lens. Given the focus of Critical Race Theory on race and the
law, especially on how institutions perpetuate racism against social outsiders
through the law, Critical Race Theory is an appropriate and valuable lens for
considering matters that receive attention in Patterson’s book.5
I.
PATTERSON’S HISTORICAL NARRATIVE AND EVALUATION OF THE BROWN
LEGACY
Patterson begins his narrative by recounting the now-familiar story of a
U.S. school system that tolerated racial segregation before Brown (p. 16). To
help demonstrate the effects of such a system on minorities, Patterson points
out that in 1954, even after some funding increases, black public schools in the
South received only 60% of the money that white schools received (p. xvii).
Because education requires adequate financial support, Patterson suggests that
such an inequitable system of funding cannot have helped minority students.
Continuing the story, Patterson explains the strategy that attorneys at the
NAACP’s Legal Defense and Education Fund employed in Brown. Led by
Thurgood Marshall and relying on controversial psychological studies, the
attorneys argued that racial segregation in schools hurt minority children from
an early age (p. 44). The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately agreed and, in a
much-anticipated opinion, ordered an end to constitutionally sponsored
segregation in public education (p. 66).
Brown is far from the end of Patterson’s narrative because, as the author
observes, shortly after Brown many problems with court-ordered desegregation
developed. For example, some cities refused to desegregate. During the fall of
1954, the town of Milford, Delaware practiced token desegregation at its high
school, admitting only eleven black students (p. 73). Also, racial harmony
between white and black students in the newly “integrated” schools was
strained, particularly among older students who had not grown up with

5. For more on Critical Race Theory, see Section II of this Book Review.
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desegregated schools (p. 166). Moreover, many white families left the big
cities and headed for the suburbs, leaving the children of black families to
populate inner-city schools (p. 164). Indeed, these problems would not go
away easily.
Although Patterson’s historical narrative is insightful, the more interesting
part of the book is Patterson’s evaluation of the Brown case almost a halfcentury after the Supreme Court issued the opinion. Patterson’s evaluation
goes beyond the Brown opinion and attempts to evaluate the lasting imprint that
the case has had on U.S. culture. Careful in weighing the evidence, Patterson
comes to the tentative conclusion that Brown left much remaining work in the
desegregation of U.S. schools and society more generally, but also achieved
much with regard to race and the law.
In looking at several of the shortcomings of public education today,
Patterson comments that “America’s inability to desegregate many of its
neighborhoods and schools . . . stood out in the early twenty-first century as the
largest failure among efforts . . . to move toward greater interracial mixing” (p.
211). For instance, during the 1998-1999 school year, 90% of Chicago public
school students were African American or Hispanic, and 90% of Detroit public
school students were African American (p. 211). Moreover, during the 19961997 school year, 68.8% of black public school students attended schools
where less than half of the student body was white (p. 212). Added to this
background is the fact that judicially supervised desegregation in many public
school systems in cities such as Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Minneapolis,
Buffalo, Nashville, Grand Rapids, Jacksonville, and Mobile has ended or will
be phased out (p. 212).
In addition to what he calls “America’s inability to desegregate” (p. 211),
Patterson notes an important educational shortcoming linked to school
desegregation attempts and the academic development of minority students.
On standardized tests such as the SAT, Patterson claims that black students as a
group, regardless of class, still perform more poorly than white students as a
group (p. 215). Experts are unsure how to explain this phenomenon.6 Thus, for
many Blacks the hopes of the Brown era have become an “all-too-distant
dream” (p. 220), leaving the color line to become “[t]he problem of the twentyfirst century” (p. xxix).
Despite his obvious concern over the lasting effects of Brown, Patterson
still sees the 1954 case as a landmark achievement. He notes that Brown “took
aim at the heart of constitutionally sanctioned Jim Crow” and eventually helped
to desegregate many schools in both border and Southern states (p. 221); the
decision enabled the courts in subsequent cases to give “constitutional
standing” to the changes that came with attempts at desegregation (p. 222).

6. For more on the discussion of the merits of standardized testing, see note 19.
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Furthermore, Brown “had considerable, though incalculable, symbolic value,
for liberal [W]hites as well as for many hopeful [B]lacks” (p. 222). In an
attempt to reconcile his approval with his concerns, Patterson notes that while
lawyers can work for social improvement, as in the case of the NAACP lawyers
in Brown, they can do only so much. Society has its role to play as well (p.
223).7 Overall, Patterson’s evidence seems to agree with this point.
II.
ANALYSIS OF PATTERSON’S CONCLUSIONS THROUGH A CRITICAL RACE
THEORY LENS
As noted above, this Book Review will employ Critical Race Theory to
evaluate Patterson’s critical narrative. Critical Race Theory is an appropriate
intellectual tool for evaluating Patterson’s conclusions because Critical Race
Theory, like Patterson’s book, deals with the intersection of law and race.8
Specifically, Critical Race Theory addresses the law from the perspectives of
racial outsiders, especially black individuals,9 and considers how the law
constructs race.10 Critical Race Theory seeks to remind society “how deeply
issues of racial ideology and power continue to matter in American life.”11
Given its frequently negative focus,12 Critical Race Theory is often
outside the mainstream of U.S. legal thought; thus, one might think of Critical
Race Theory as relatively radical in nature. This negative focus of many
adherents of Critical Race Theory will be helpful in demonstrating more clearly
how Patterson has taken a balanced approach to evaluating Brown and its
progeny because, in addition to considering some of the negative aspects of
history that many adherents of Critical Race Theory would address, Patterson
also offers some positive aspects of Brown’s legacy. While not as activist as
the work of many adherents of Critical Race Theory, Patterson’s work is
generally well-rounded.
Derrick Bell, the main founder of Critical Race Theory in the 1970s,13 has

7. Referring to GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 401.
8. For more on the dimensions of Critical Race Theory from a variety of perspectives, see
KIMBERLE CRENSHAW, NEIL GOTANDA, & KENDALL THOMAS, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (1995) and RICHARD DELGADO, CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (1995).
9. BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 181 (1994).
10. CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 8, at xxv.
11. Id. at xxxii.
12. See Derrick A. Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992).
13. CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 8, at xi (quoting Cornel West). While many other
theorists have embraced Critical Race Theory, due to the measured space of a book review and
Derrick Bell’s status as primary founder of Critical Race Theory, this Book Review mainly limits
its discussion of Critical Race Theory to some of the key ideas about which Bell has theorized.
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theorized about a number of insightful concepts that help to drive the analysis
of this Book Review. Particularly appropriate for application to the material
Patterson discusses are the ideas of equality of opportunity versus equality of
result, involuntary black sacrifice, white self-interest, and single-race schools.
This section of the Book Review will address these concepts in turn.
A. Equality of Opportunity Versus Equality of Result
Although not specifically using the terms, Patterson’s book suggests that,
in the wake of Brown, equality of opportunity has not led to equality of result
for many minorities. As Bell notes, equality of opportunity does not guarantee,
and often does not produce, equality of result.14 Equality of opportunity is the
requirement that the law offer the same chance to people of all races, while
equality of result considers whether people of all races actually experience
equality.15 Bell claims that equality of opportunity alone is inadequate because
it ignores “the political import and social significance of race and a long history
of subordination and exploitation.”16
The effects of school desegregation differ depending on whether one
considers equality of opportunity or equality of result. In terms of equality of
opportunity, the text of Brown itself clearly has put an end to legalized
segregation in public schools. Chief Justice Earl Warren stated so in a succinct
manner: “We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
‘separate but equal’ has no place.”17 However, Patterson’s evidence suggests
that equality of opportunity18 has not led to equality of result. As noted above,
Patterson points out that several major cities like Chicago and Detroit still have
predominantly minority school populations (p. 211). In part, this result may be
because Chicago and Detroit have large minority populations. However, the
90% figures are so one sided that one must ask what has happened. No doubt
many well-to-do Whites have left the city limits (p. 164). Regardless, many
minorities remain in inner-city schools and undoubtedly must face the problems
of crime, drugs, and under funding. It is easy to imagine how such problems
erode the learning of minority students.
14. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 136 (2000).
15. Id. See also Derrick Bell, Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mystique, 57 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1595 (1989) (addressing equality of opportunity and equality of result in the context of
affirmative action).
16. BELL, supra note 14, at 136.
17. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
18. One could argue that equality of opportunity in terms of rights that the law protects is
not the same as equality of opportunity in terms of the resources that the government owes to
minority students. The legal opportunity can be present, but the material opportunity may not be.
For example, a minority student may have the right to be free of racial discrimination in
education, but the student may not have access to books, computers, well-trained teachers, and
other resources that can help him or her succeed. Hence, the concept of equality of opportunity is
a somewhat fluid one.
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If, like Patterson, one can accept the traditional notion of standardized
tests as an important measure of ability,19 then the overall lower SAT
performance by Blacks compared to the performance by Whites would be
evidence of educational shortcoming (p. 215). Furthermore, the income
prospects for Blacks, which are two-thirds of what such prospects are for
Whites, look so bleak that many Blacks may have no motivation to succeed on
tests such as the SAT (p. 216). This result might contribute to a self-fulfilling
prophecy of failure. Thus, despite the noble words of Brown, Patterson’s
evidence shows that many minority students still face substantial obstacles to
equality of result in education.
As Patterson points out, more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence appears
to lack concern for equality of result as well. The 1992 case Freeman v. Pitts20
illustrates this point. In Freeman, the plaintiffs sued because in one Georgia
county over half of all students were attending schools that were 90% or more
black. County officials claimed that private decision-making, not government
action, led to resegregation of the schools. In reply, the Court held that private
decisions that lead to resegregation are beyond the realm of constitutional
concern (p. 198).
A Critical Race Theory critique of Freeman likely would point out that,

19. This assumption about standardized testing has come under scrutiny. See, e.g., Susan
Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Idea, 84 CAL.
L. REV. 953 (1996) (arguing that a U.S. “testocracy” “abstracts data from individuals, quantifies
those individuals based on numerical rankings, exaggerates its ability to predict those individuals’
future performance, and then disguises under the rubric of ‘qualifications’ the selection of those
who are more socio-economically privileged”). To develop their position, Sturm and Guinier
have maintained that students whose parents can afford test preparation courses tend to do the best
on standardized tests. Id. at 991. In addition, Sturm and Guinier argue that the correlation
between standardized aptitude test scores like scores from the SAT and LSAT and first-year
grades in academic programs like college or law school is lower than the correlation between a
person’s weight and his or her height. Id. at 971. On these last two points, according to Sturm
and Guinier, standardized test scores tell more about a student’s past than his or her future. Id. at
991. Furthermore, standardized testing assumes that only one “correct” way of doing something
exists, even in cases of complex problems, and that humans have “objective” ways of evaluating
such performance. Id. at 986-87. For some alternatives to the use of standardized admissions
tests, see Richard Delgado, Official Elitism or Institutional Self Interest? 10 Reasons Why UCDavis Should Abandon the LSAT (and Why Other Good Law Schools Should Follow Suit), 34
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 593, 611-14 (2001) (suggesting, among other approaches, making admissions
tests optional, guaranteeing admission based on factors like grades, and admitting larger first-year
classes).
Not all observers share this concern over standardized admissions tests. For arguments in
favor of the status quo, see Dan Subotnik, Goodbye to the SAT, LSAT? Hello to Equity by
Lottery? Evaluating Lani Guinier’s Plan for Ending Race Consciousness, 43 HOW. L.J. 141
(2000) and Gail L. Heriot & Christopher T. Wonnell, Standardized Tests Under the Magnifying
Glass: A Defense of the LSAT Against Recent Charges of Bias, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 467
(2003). Given the sharp disagreement about traditional standardized testing, continuing
examination of this issue is appropriate. Nonetheless, the assumption of the validity of testing still
persists in academia and elsewhere.
20. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
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while the Court may recognize the right of children to attend integrated
schools, the Court is unwilling to act in all cases to ensure such integration.
Thus, the black children in the resegregated county have the legal right to
attend integrated schools, but when the decisions of private individuals
interfere with that right, the Court is not concerned with the problem. Critical
Race Theory advocates may argue that it matters little whether governmental
actors or private individuals are denying the children a well-funded and
integrated education; the children still lose. With this point in mind, a Critical
Race Theory perspective would observe that the government, here the Court,
should act to remedy this problem because the harm remains; using the rubric
of non-governmental action is an insufficient excuse for permitting children to
lose life-shaping educational opportunities.
In fairness to the Court, one should note that this argument is particularly
difficult to sustain because of the need for plaintiffs to prove state action in
equal protection cases.21 Unless the government somehow supports private
action, no equal protection violation can result. Although the students lose out,
legally there is no party at which to point a finger.
Thus, an application of the concepts of equality of opportunity and
equality of result to the legacy of Brown, including the relatively recent
Freeman decision, leads to essentially the same concerns over results that
Patterson articulates in his book. Through Brown and its progeny, the law may
support minority children, but many such children still suffer educationally. To
a great extent, then, Patterson’s analysis tracks analysis that would come from a
Critical Race Theory perspective.
B. Involuntary Black Sacrifice
Although Patterson’s analysis does not explicitly call upon the notion of
involuntary black sacrifice, his analysis does indicate that desegregation has
failed many black individuals. Nevertheless, his analysis also considers the
positive moral stance of the Brown decision and its heirs. Involuntary black
sacrifice is another idea that Bell offers in developing Critical Race Theory.22
The concept of involuntary black sacrifice holds that, in an effort to reconcile
their differences, various groups of Whites sacrifice black interests, much as
humans in mythology would sacrifice animals to reconcile differences with the
gods.23
One historical example of black sacrifice is the Civil War era
emancipation of slaves. At first blush, freedom from slavery would look like a
21. The U.S. Constitution generally limits governmental rather than private action.
WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
1107 (1998).
22. BELL, supra note 14, at 53-55.
23. Id. at 54.
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major step forward for Blacks, but proponents of Critical Race Theory maintain
otherwise.24 Arguably, the process of freeing slaves allowed the North to
weaken the South by undermining the southern social structure and thereby
ultimately preserved the Union. However, the South retained its white-overblack hierarchy of Jim Crow. The North and the South settled their dispute and
Blacks retained second-class status, if that at all, in the United States. Nowhere
in the result did the parties with power seriously address the problems of
African Americans.25
As suggested, Patterson sees Brown as a case whose legacy is mixed. On
one hand, segregated inner-city school systems like the overwhelmingly black
school system in Detroit illustrate the limits of Brown (p. 211). Clearly, this
type of issue remains a problem. Additionally, Patterson discusses cases like
Milliken v. Bradley,26 in which the plaintiffs alleged inequities in the racial
balance in Detroit schools to show how the Supreme Court began to back away
from its liberal position of 1954 (p. 178). As Patterson points out,
approximately 72% of inner-city school children in Milliken were black (pp.
178-79). The plaintiffs hoped to obtain an inter-district busing arrangement
with Detroit’s suburbs to remedy the problem. Although the Court found
disparate treatment of white and black students in Detroit, the Court held that,
absent any evidence that the suburban districts intended to discriminate, an
inter-district busing remedy was inappropriate (pp. 179-80). In effect, the
Court held that the plaintiffs had suffered a legal wrong but were not due a
correction of that wrong. NAACP attorney Nathaniel Jones observed, “[t]he
Court has said to black people[,] ‘You have rights but you don’t have a
remedy.’ We’re back in the same position as we were before Dred Scott” (p.
180).27
On the other hand, despite shortcomings like these, Patterson views
Brown as an opinion that “took aim at the heart of constitutionally sanctioned
Jim Crow” and helped to desegregate many schools in both the border states
and the South (p. 221). Additionally, Patterson points out that, in the wake of
Brown, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act28 has opened the door for

24. Id. at 54-55.
25. See also Derrick Bell, “Here Come de Judge”: The Role of Faith in Progressive
Decision-Making, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 8-9 (1999) (considering slavery in the U.S. Constitution,
the Compromise of 1877, and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), as other examples of
involuntary black sacrifice); Derrick A. Bell, California’s Proposition 209: A Temporary
Diversion on the Road to Racial Disaster, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1447, 1455-56 (1997) (pointing
to the recurring nature of involuntary sacrifice in the United States).
26. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
27. Patterson adds that Justice William Douglas, dissenting in Milliken, claimed that the
Court had labeled Detroit’s schools “not only separate but inferior.”
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (prohibiting public and private employers from
discriminating based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”).
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minorities in the employment context, while the 1965 Voting Rights Act29 has
granted equal access in voting (pp. 124, 127). Today, few people would
seriously challenge the notion that minorities are due the legal rights of
discrimination-free employment and voting.30 These points suggest that
Patterson does not fully embrace the notion of black sacrifice in the post-Brown
world.
In contrast, adherents of Critical Race Theory would go further than
Patterson. They would argue that the results of Brown a half-century after the
Court issued the decision show that Blacks are again victims of the
reconciliation of tensions between white factions. In this case, the quarreling
white parties were the segregationists and the desegregationists. The result in
Brown pleased the desegregationists because schools had a new legal duty to
integrate and, indeed, many schools adhered to that duty. However, the
segregationists received a portion of what they wanted in that they were able to
delay the process of desegregation. Moreover, today major inner-city school
systems in cities like Chicago and Detroit are largely segregated. As the
aforementioned points about Blacks gaining a weaker education in poorer
inner-city schools and performing at lower levels on the SAT would suggest,
African Americans—this time as students—are left behind once again. An
adherent of Critical Race Theory could point out that this result is akin to the
result of the infamous Plessy v. Ferguson31 decision that came in the wake of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s32 ratification; again, the white power structure has
not kept its promises to the black minority.
Specifically, an adherent of Critical Race Theory would hone in on
Patterson’s Milliken example and argue that Milliken was just one more
occasion for black sacrifice. Under this paradigm, the liberal desegregationists
and more conservative separatist forces disagreed about what, if anything, to do
about the disproportionately high number of black students in inner-city Detroit

29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (1965). For an unorthodox perspective on the beginnings of
the Voting Rights Act, see Brian K. Landsberg, Sumter County, Alabama and the Origins of the
Voting Rights Act, 54 ALA. L. REV. 877 (2003) (addressing the relationship between events in one
Alabama county and the famous 1965 federal legislation).
30. One might point out that being entitled to these rights is not necessarily the same as
being able to benefit from these rights. For example, a critique of voting rights in the United
States would point out that many minority individuals in Florida were unable to enjoy their right
to vote during the controversial 2000 presidential election. See, e.g., John C. Knechtle, “One
Person, One Vote” Magnified, 2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 381, 385 (2001) (expressing concern about
the equal protection voting rights of minorities in districts with less accurate voting machinery);
Allan J. Lichtman, What Really Happened in Florida’s 2000 Presidential Election, 32 J. LEGAL
STUD. 221 (2003) (pointing out that ballots of black voters had a much higher set-aside rate than
ballots of white voters).
31. 163 U.S. 537 (holding that racially separate public facilities were constitutional so long
as they were equal).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (guaranteeing equal protection to all individuals,
including Blacks).
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schools. After the legal battle, the desegregationists received a blessing from
the Court that their concern over racial discrimination in Detroit schools was
legitimate. Meanwhile, the more conservative forces had their way in that they
did not have to take action to solve the problem. In the end, the black students
remained trapped in inner-city schools that were poorly funded and probably
less safe than the schools in the Detroit suburbs (pp. 179-80). As such, the
pendulum is swinging back in the direction of black sacrifice.33
Accordingly, although Patterson recognizes the limitations of the Brown
legacy, he never maintains that, in light of Brown, various groups of Whites
have settled their differences by ignoring the needs of Blacks. Indeed,
Patterson argues that one can see the positive side of the Brown legacy. Thus,
he considers both weaknesses and strengths of Brown and its ensuing legacy.
C. White Self-Interest
Although to a lesser extent than with involuntary black sacrifice, Patterson
hints at the concept of white self-interest. Quite simply put, this Critical Race
Theory concept is one in which Whites act in a way that benefits them and, if
their action happens to be beneficial to Blacks or other minorities, then the
result is merely a fortunate coincidence for minorities.34 Under this concept,
white actors do not actively consider the needs of racial minorities.
Several pieces of evidence in the book merely hint at white self-interest.
For instance, Patterson notes that Brown created “feelings of guilt and
responsibility” among many liberal Whites (p. 221). Assumedly, Whites
wanted to purge these unpleasant feelings, although Patterson does not state so
explicitly. Also, Patterson maintains that Brown “took aim at the heart of
constitutionally sanctioned Jim Crow” (p. 221). This statement implies that the
Whites who issued the decision may have enhanced their images by taking the
high moral ground. Despite several more such references, Patterson never
argues outright that Brown was self-serving of white interests.
An adherent of Critical Race Theory would be much more explicit than
Patterson. Indeed, Bell has argued that much of the progress that followed
Brown served the interests of the Whites who brought about the changes.35 For

33. In fairness to the Supreme Court, a critique of this Critical Race Theory analysis would
point out that the Court in Milliken faced a problem where the requested solution, inter-district
busing, would have placed a burden on entities apparently not discriminating against black
students. The Court found discriminatory intent in the Detroit schools but failed to find
discriminatory intent in the suburban schools. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974).
Thus, the Court had to decide whether to hold non-discriminating schools responsible. Arguably,
the Court decided against disciplining the schools in the Detroit suburbs for what the Detroit
schools were doing.
34. BELL, supra note 14, at 205-08.
35. Id. Bell also has referred to this concept as the “interest convergence dilemma.” See
Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV.
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example, Brown provided credibility to the U.S. government during the Cold
War. The decision also gave governmental assurance to Blacks that the
freedoms for which Blacks had fought during World War II would be available
to them at home after the conflict ended.36 With regard to these points, the U.S.
government could avoid looking hypocritical; instead, it could take the high
moral ground on the world stage. From this perspective, Whites in power did
not have the interests of Blacks at heart.
To an extent, Bell’s analysis can make sense, but implying that the
decision rests on weaker moral ground because Brown served white interests
misses an important point. In one way or another, acts of goodwill toward
others are by nature self-serving. For instance, the social worker who works
with the poor probably derives pleasure from helping people in need or from
trying to achieve personal standards of morality. This pleasure is self-serving
in a way, but the pleasure the social worker receives by helping others does not
detract from the act itself; those helped still receive the aid. In the same vein,
Brown was an act of goodwill from the white establishment towards the black
community because the decision recognized that U.S. society had shortchanged
many Blacks on educational opportunities. While one might describe Brown as
self-serving, the decision still opened the door to helping Blacks make progress
toward achieving a better place in society.
Although Patterson stops well short of making the argument that an
adherent of Critical Race Theory like Bell would make, Patterson’s hesitancy
does not necessarily undermine his overall conclusion about the simultaneous
presence of negative and positive implications of Brown. Given the noted
limitation in the concept of white self-interest, one should not fault Patterson
for largely omitting the argument.
D. Single-Race Schools
Finally, while he does consider options besides desegregation, Patterson
does not address the concept of single-race schools. Bell discusses the concept
of single-race schools as an alternative to integrated schools.37 He notes that
such schools aim to promote “a sense of cultural pride” among black students
L. REV. 518 (1980) (critiquing the Brown decision). For more on Brown and interest
convergence, see Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Forty-Five Years After the Fact, 26
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 171, 197 (2000) and DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 59-68 (2004) [hereinafter
BELL, SILENT COVENANTS]. For more recent examples of white self-interest, see Derrick Bell,
Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (2003) (looking at Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003), and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), as instances of white self-interest)
and BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra, at 149-51 (focusing on Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s
opinion in Grutter).
36. BELL, supra note 14, at 207.
37. The single-race schools of which Bell is thinking are those that exist by choice rather
than those that have existed as a function of de facto segregation. BELL, supra note 14, at 222.
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and are designed to address problems, including “discrimination, joblessness,
poverty, and crime[,]” that Blacks often face disproportionately in comparison
with members of other races.38
Although he does consider that desegregation might not have been the
best remedy for addressing the situation of Blacks in the United States,
Patterson does not say much about single-race schools. Specifically, Patterson
offers the testimony of a black woman from Wilmington, North Carolina, who
attended a black-only high school and was later concerned because, when her
high school had to desegregate, Blacks felt like outsiders in their own school
(p. 168-69). The implication is that desegregation may not always help
minority students. Patterson also mentions that in the 1990s some black leaders
questioned the assumption that desegregation was an appropriate remedy for
educational shortcomings (p. 201). Nonetheless, this analysis leaves open the
door to single-race schools as an alternative remedy.
An adherent of Critical Race Theory likely would take issue with
Patterson’s neglect of discussing single-race schools as a viable alternative to
desegregation; indeed, such an adherent even may maintain that this type of
neglect is illustrative of hidden white racism.39 In focusing on desegregation—
the major white solution to black educational problems—Patterson virtually
ignores the minority solution of single-race schools and thus inadvertently
stifles the minority voices in the discussion on how to remedy educational
shortcomings.
This Critical Race Theory critique does make a point. Given that the
nature of Patterson’s historical evaluation stems from the quest of Brown to
integrate schools, the author’s focus on mixed schools is understandable. Yet,
in considering the effects of Brown after a half-century, Patterson at least could
offer a concise discussion of single-race schools as one possible alternative to
integration. After all, Patterson admits that integration has not worked
perfectly, as he suggests when he discusses black performance on tests such as
the SAT (p. 215). Thus, Bell’s point that single-race schools can help to
address culturally specific problems merits serious attention.
CONCLUSION
As this Book Review has argued, Patterson has offered a mostly balanced,
critical historical narrative in Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights
Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy. Analysis of Patterson’s book through a
Critical Race Theory lens has helped to test the conclusions of the book.
Specifically, consideration of the notion of equality of opportunity versus
equality of result led to much the same conclusion that Patterson reaches.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 139 (referencing Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987)).
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However, an adherent of Critical Race Theory most likely would apply a
harsher critique to the efforts at racial reform that have come in the wake of
Brown, especially with regard to the concepts of involuntary black sacrifice,
white self-interest, and single-race schools. While Patterson’s work deserves
some criticism for not discussing single-race schools as a serious alternative
remedy, the radical nature of Critical Race Theory—which often focuses
exclusively on the negative—leaves room for Patterson to address the positive
aspects of Brown that adherents of Critical Race Theory would be inclined to
ignore. Because his narrative considers both the negative and positive
implications of Brown, Patterson comes acceptably close to presenting a
balanced historical evaluation.
In summing up his position, Patterson effectively weighs the historical
evidence by calling upon the following thoughts of former Legal Defense and
Education Fund attorney Jack Greenberg: “‘Altogether, school desegregation
has been a story of conspicuous achievements, flawed by marked failures, the
causes of which lie beyond the capacity of lawyers to correct. Lawyers can do
right, they can do good, but they have their limits. The rest of the job is up to
society.’”40 Half a century after Brown, this is a relatively fair description of
where the United States now stands.

40. Quoting GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 401.
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